Showing posts with label historiography. Show all posts
Showing posts with label historiography. Show all posts

Historiographic Saints


Isaac Hecker, circa 1890
In the spirit of RiAH's 10 year anniversary, we welcome a guest post from historian William Cossen. You can follow him at www.williamscossen.com and on Twitter @WilliamCossen.

What do historians of Catholicism owe to the saints about whom they write?

This question has been on my mind since the American Catholic Historical Association’s Annual Meeting in Denver this past January.  Two moments at the conference together served for me as the genesis of this question.  The first moment took the form of a comment from Thomas Rzeznik during his presentation for the ACHA’s presidential roundtable, about which I have written in more detail on John Fea’s Way of Improvement Leads Home blog.  Rzeznik noted that scholars of Catholicism should remain mindful of the multiple audiences they serve through their research and writing: the academy, the institutional church, and interested laypeople.

The second moment emerged following my own panel on Catholicism and Americanism.  I had a conversation on the state of the field of Catholic history with the panel’s organizer, Erin Bartram.   Both of our papers dealt with Isaac Hecker, a central figure in the study of mid- to late nineteenth-century U.S. Catholic history, and we briefly pondered the nature of writing about an individual such as Hecker, who is presently being investigated for potential canonization.

It is obviously not uncommon for historians of Catholicism to write about men and women who have been recognized as saints by the Catholic Church.  This may be somewhat rarer in scholarship on U.S. Catholicism, which reflects the fewer canonized saints from the United States than from other countries with longer histories of an extensive Catholic presence.  There are, however, several fine examples of recent historical scholarship that include canonized (or soon-to-be canonized) Catholics as central figures in their narratives.



Why this has been on my mind is that my research on Hecker could have the potential to turn up what may be, at least to present-day observers, unflattering information on this Servant of God (an initial step in the process of canonization).   While Hecker’s life has been examined as part of the history of transcendentalism, the religious conversion experience, and the Americanist controversy within late nineteenth-century Catholicism, my research on Hecker explores how his writings and their intellectual legacy intersected with ideologies of race and growing American imperialism during the same period.  Remaining mindful of the multiple audiences of a scholar of Catholicism, I want to employ a rigorous methodology befitting an academic historian.  I also want to provide a more detailed picture of Hecker that is neither hagiographical nor exaggeratedly critical, recognizing that the institutional church and Hecker’s canonization promoters may be undertaking the simultaneous process of writing their own histories of Hecker.  Following Pope John Paul II’s reform of the canonization process in 1983, religion journalist Kenneth L. Woodward writes, the Catholic Church’s saint-makers began “employ[ing] the academic model of researching and writing a doctoral dissertation.  Hereafter, causes would be accepted or rejected according to the standards of critical historiography.”   In contemporary saint-making, individuals involved with the formal canonization process as well as academic historians operating outside the church’s institutional structures are all involved in creating saintly historiographies that may or may not exist at odds with one another.

Subsequent to the ostensible historicizing and de-hagiographizing of the saint-making process, can non-church-affiliated, academic historians now function as unofficial and even unwitting promoters of a would-be saint’s canonization (if the history produced depicts saintliness) or as devil’s advocates (if the narrative produced depicts something else entirely)?   To what extent should (or even can) academic historians of Catholicism, when aware of an ongoing sainthood investigation for one of their scholarly subjects, let this knowledge play a role in shaping their narratives?  Can such a consideration be avoided once this knowledge has been attained?

It can be easy to lose sight of the constructedness of saints and especially of historians’ roles in the work of such construction.  Sociologist Pierre Delooz argues that “all saints are more or less constructed in that, being necessarily saints for other people, they are remodelled in the collective representation which is made of them.”   This project, though, did not cease in some remote past when the stories of saints were being written by hagiographers but rather continues to the present with the stories of saints being written by historians.  Saint-making and saint-unmaking are not discrete moments with discernible temporal boundaries but are rather ongoing projects of which historians are a part.  “Hagiography,” religion scholar Robert A. Orsi writes,” is best understood as a creative process that goes on and on in the circumstances of everyday life.”  It is not just devotees of the saints, however, who participate in this “creative process.”  Historians also play a central role in contextualizing the saints, separating myth from fact, revising the narratives of their lives, and at times recreating their hagiographies.  This scholarly production of saints is a reason why, as Orsi describes, “holy figures get caught up and implicated in struggles on earth.  They bear the marks of history.”   In describing the emergence in the early modern period of professional medical expertise as a required component of canonization investigations, historian Bradford Bouley explains, “[J]udging a prospective corpse during a canonization proceeding was not a simple act where the evidence at hand was easily reduced to a comprehensible category.  Rather, it was a process of negotiation in which the various demands of the community, the faith, and the practice of medicine conditioned the ways in which the truth of the saintly body was understood.”   The ongoing practice of saint-remaking is similarly a negotiated undertaking carried out as a dialogue between historians, their subjects, and their various audiences.

Related image
The canonizaiton of John Paul II and John XXIII


And what about that third audience that Rzeznik mentioned?  Interested laypeople.  Not only does the religious order Hecker founded, the Paulist Fathers, still operate actively, but Hecker must remain for some a figure of veneration with a fama sanctitatis (reputation for holiness) that would justify his cause for canonization.  The balance I am trying to strike between respect for Hecker the historical figure, respect for lay and clerical Catholics who may venerate him, and respect for the historical method, is a tenuous one.  I do not want to alienate this third audience if my scholarship casts Hecker in a negative light, but I also owe this audience, my other audiences, and Hecker an honest review of the primary sources wherever they may lead.  This consideration gives me pause to think about why a religious figure and their present-day admirers should command any more historical respect than their secular counterparts.  Is this just an unconscious blinder worn by historians of explicitly religious figures?  That is, do we ever adopt an additional degree of caution when analyzing religious subjects compared to non-religious subjects, even though the categories of religious and non-religious are themselves continually made and remade historically and historiographically?

In 1918, a piece in The Catholic Historical Review reflected on the effect of techniques of higher criticism being brought to bear on the histories of saints.  The unnamed author wrote that “American Catholic history thus far is largely biographical, and it is from the published lives of the leaders of the Church here that the future historian will be compelled to gather the larger part of his materials.”  They maintained that “if American Catholic history is to be protected against historiasters of the future,” historians of Catholicism must adopt a modern, rigorous, “technical method of research, of criticism, and of composition.”  This methodology applied equally to the lives of avowedly religious figures as it did to ostensibly non-religious figures.  The author argued that such a scientific method of historicizing necessarily entailed “criticism,” which, although “not the chief end of historical research,” was essential for the creation of an accurate narrative of the history of American Catholicism.”

This Progressive Era methodology of historical criticism of the church and its leading lights, however, was fraught with dangers to the historian.  Jesuit author Hippolyte Delehaye, a specialist in the study of hagiography, wrote in his 1907 book The Legends of the Saints: An Introduction to Hagiography, that “[r]eligious-minded people who regard with equal veneration not only the saints themselves but everything associated with them,” were appalled by historically critical interpretations of saints’ lives.  Delehaye was aware, then, of the multiple audiences of a historian of Catholicism; in this case, these audiences were academics practicing critical analysis and religious readers disturbed by an apparent undermining of saints’ cults.  The historian writing from a critical perspective about a saint or potential saint is therefore open, Delehaye argued, to charges of irreligiosity and of harboring an anti-saint attitude.  Delehaye thought this to be most unfortunate since many such historians, seeking only to treat their subjects and their discipline with respect, had been painted as “iconoclasts.”

Contemporary historians engaging in critical readings of figures regarded by some or many Catholics to be saints or at least saintly may face a difficult double bind: writing too positively about these individuals could lead to charges from fellow academics that they are writing hagiographies, and writing too negatively about them may lead to charges from these figures’ institutional and lay promoters that the historian has insufficiently respected the lived religious experiences of their subjects and their subjects’ devotees.  This is essentially the challenge facing any scholar, historian Jill Lepore explains, when he or she is “[f]inding out and writing about people, living or dead.”  In her 2001 article “Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography,” Lepore writes, “It is necessary to balance intimacy with distance while at the same time being inquisitive to the point of invasiveness.  Getting too close to your subject is a major danger, but not getting to know her well enough is just as likely.”   For scholars of Catholicism, these difficulties may be rooted in the sense that hagiography and history can be neatly dichotomized, a position which would reveal a somewhat hubristic view of modern historians operating above hagiography and older hagiographers being incapable of writing accurate history.  I would like to suggest that there exists a finer line between the two narrative forms than may be acknowledged at first glance.  Jesuit scholar Michel de Certeau argues in The Writing of History that hagiography’s “combination of acts, places, and themes indicates a particular structure that refers not just primarily to ‘what took place,’ as does history, but to ‘what is exemplary.’”   From this perspective, the hagiographer is grappling just as much as is the historian with the challenge of creating for readers a usable past.

Whether a scholar of religion approaches her or his subjects from a position of methodological atheism or agnosticism or out of the belief that the presence of the supernatural in the world is a historical fact, this same scholar must reckon with the reality and associated responsibility that her or his scholarship can play a role, whether directly or indirectly, in shaping the historical memory, the prospects for canonization, and the nature of the veneration of a figure regarded by people of faith as a saint transcending history.


Bill graduated with a PhD in history from Penn State University in December 2016. He serves as the book review editor for H-SHGAPE (Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era) and is a member of the faculty of The Gwinnett School of Mathematics, Science, and Technology. His articles have been published in American Catholic Studies, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, and U.S. Catholic Historian, and he has an article on Catholic labor schools forthcoming in The Catholic Historical Review. Cossen is currently revising his first book manuscript, which is titled Making Catholic America: Religious Nationalism in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era.



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Notes

 Dr. Bartram gave me permission to mention this conversation.  See author’s personal correspondence, June 23, 2017.

Examples include Anne M. Boylan, The Origins of Women’s Activism: New York and Boston, 1797-1840 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 101-109, 118-124 [on Elizabeth Ann Bayley Seton]; Allan Greer, “Natives and Nationalism: The Americanization of Kateri Tekakwitha,” The Catholic Historical Review 90, no. 2 (April 2004): 260-272; Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who Study  Them (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 110-145 [on Gemma Galgani].

On the historical development of the saint-making process, see Pierre Delooz, “Towards a Sociological Study of Canonized Sainthood in the Catholic Church,” in Saints and Their Cults: Studies in Religious Sociology, Folklore and History, ed. Stephen Wilson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 189-216; Kenneth L. Woodward, Making Saints: How the Catholic Church Determines Who Becomes a Saint, Who Doesn’t, and Why (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Fernando Vidal, “Miracles, Science, and Testimony in Post-Tridentine Saint-Making,” Science in Context 20, no. 3 (Sept. 2007): 481-508; Bradford Bouley, “Negotiated Sanctity: Incorruption, Community, and Medical Expertise,” The Catholic Historical Review 102, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 1-25.

Woodward, Making Saints, 91.

The formal power of the promotor fidei (popularly known as the devil’s advocate) was substantially diminished by the 1983 reform.

 Delooz, “Towards a Sociological Study of Canonized Sainthood in the Catholic Church,” 195 [emphases in original].

Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth, 4, 113.

Bouley, “Negotiated Sanctity,” 25.

“Historical Criticism,” The Catholic Historical Review 3, no. 3 (Oct. 1917), 368.

Hippolyte Delehaye, The Legends of the Saints: An Introduction to Hagiography, trans. V.M. Crawford (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), vii, viii.  Delehaye defines “hagiography” as a form of writing of “a religious character” that “aim[ed] at edification” (2).

Jill Lepore, “Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography,” The Journal of American History 88, no. 1 (June 2001), 129.

Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 270.

On methodological atheism and agnosticism, see Michael A. Cantrell, “Must a Scholar of Religion Be Methodologically Atheistic or Agnostic?,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 84, no. 2 (June 2016): 373-400.

On historical presence, see Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth; Orsi, History and Presence (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016).  This scholarly reckoning represents an example of “abundant historiography,” which Orsi describes as “approaching events that are not safely cordoned off in the past, that are not purified, but whose routes extend into the present, into the writing of history itself.”  See Orsi, History and Presence, 71.

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The Reformation as a Psychological Event: Celebrating the 500th Anniversary of the Reformation with Erich Fromm


Peter Cajka

The new release tables at Hodges Figgis – a three-story bookstore in downtown Dublin – greet frequent shoppers like me with a spate of fresh books on Luther, Reformation historiography, Calvin, and the Counter Reformation. As we mark the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, it may be useful to consider how the event gets interpreted by thinkers unconstrained by the rules of academic history. Modern thinkers, for or against, Protestant or Catholic, have never shied away from discerning the Reformation’s deeper meanings. A guest at a dinner party I attended a few months ago (we wondered briefly into a conversation on religion) called the Reformation “the first human rights movement in history.”

Erich Fromm, a psychoanalyst with ties to the Frankfurt School, pursues a much bleaker interpretation of the Reformation in Escape from Freedom, a book he published in 1941. The Renaissance and the rise of the market economy broke down the medieval world, began his argument, liberating men and women from social ties. “The individual was left alone and isolated,” Fromm wrote, “he was free.” Freshly aware of their individuality, Fromm argued that Luther and Calvin offered millions of people (in the middle and lower classes) an escape from this freedom. Calvin and Luther, consciously and unconsciously, encouraged followers to relinquish the self to a completely sovereign God. “Protestantism was the answer to the human needs of the frightened, uprooted, and isolated individual who had to orient and to relate himself to a new world,” Fromm grimly concludes.





Luther, according to Fromm, preached freedom by way of realizing one’s ultimate insignificance. If the individual accepts that only God grants a capacity for faith – God might be willing to grant such a person the gift of faith. This version of Luther, Fromm conceded, did encourage individuals to seek freedom: men and women should be free of the binding authority of the church. But this freedom creates an anxiety that can only be assuaged by the individual admitting their own powerlessness. The freedom provided by the end of the medieval order was a condition to be escaped. Fromm’s Luther “teaches that we should humiliate ourselves and that this very self-humiliation is the means to reliance on God’s strength” and this Luther “preaches that the individual should not feel that he is his own master.” The individual Protestant escaped freedom at the end of the day by handing possession of the self over to God. You can interpret the bible for yourself endlessly but only God grants the faith required to achieve salvation.

Calvin’s theology also diminished the anxiety of the individual by providing a flight from freedom. His doctrine of predestination held that individuals could have a new sense of security in a deracinated society with an act of complete submission. If one admitted that God had decided upon the saved and the damned, the individual relinquished his or her ability to achieve salvation by way of works, but gained the confidence of belonging to a religious group among the saved. Predestination then breathed life into a particular pathology: “the development of a frantic activity and a striving to do something,” as Fromm put it. To be assured of salvation or damnation – and assuage the anxiety of individuality – one went to work. With earthly success one granted oneself a sign of his or her salvation, and without it, one could forecast damnation. Anxiety dwindles as the fate of the soul becomes apparent. Salvation is not your hands. For Fromm, a sovereign God made the decision for the individual who had unburdened himself or herself of freedom.

Fromm’s thesis in Escape from Freedom raises questions about how and why particular religious doctrines take off in a certain historical moment. For Fromm, theologies are products of social and psychological needs. In other words, the ideas of Luther and Calvin did not appeal because of their acumen and rigor, but because these doctrines are rooted in what Fromm called the “powerful needs of personality.” The early reformation personality, in light of having been emancipated from the church and the social ties of the medieval world, craved assurance. They were eager to hand their freedom over to God (Luther’s God granted faith; Calvin’s God had already decided on the individual’s salvation). Fromm contends that while Luther and Calvin did not express such an argument consciously, such an assertion lurked unconsciously in their prose. “Although [Luther] consciously thinks in terms of the voluntary and loving character of his ‘submission to God,” Fromm wrote, “he is pervaded by a feeling of powerlessness and wickedness that makes the nature of his relationship to God one of submission.” Fromm interpreted the Reformation as a socio-psychological event. I only wish, for the sake of impolite and exciting dinner conversation, that I had given my acquaintance a taste of Fromm’s interpretation of the Reformation.


Escape from Freedom, 99.
Ibid., 101.
Ibid., 84.
Ibid., 91.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 68.

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Who gets a seat at the table?: New entrees to historiography

The blog is pleased to welcome this post from guest contributor Dr. Michael Skaggs. Michael Skaggs recently defended his dissertation, "Reform in the Queen City: Religion and Race in Cincinnati in the Era of Vatican II," in the Department of History at the University of Notre Dame. He vastly prefers Glier’s goetta over Queen City and Skyline over Gold Star. He hopes you’ll reach him at skaggsmichaela@gmail.com or on Twitter @maskaggs.


I've had occasion to read more broadly since defending my dissertation in December. I've also been grateful for the opportunity to reflect on my research interests and where they might fit into broader conversations moving forward.

In the roundtable on food history published in the December 2016 Journal of American History, Mark Padoongpatt's observations on the pertinence of "the debate over whether food is valuable because it serves as an 'entrée' into more important themes in American history or if it is inherently valuable" intrigued me. The roundtable interested me not because of my own research but because of what I've previously thought to be an outside interest: what food means and what our eating of it means to us. Yet as I made my way though Padoongpatt's generous article - his contribution to the roundtable is the most evenhanded in its evaluation of academics' and more popular food writers' contributions to the field - I realized that it would not be difficult to substitute "religion" for "food" throughout the series and still have a coherent, thought-provoking set of essays.

Consider these further sentences from Padoongpatt, this time with the substitution: "How is the story of [religion] and immigrant identity formation different from histories of immigrant identity formation through music or sports? Why does American history even need [religion] as a framework? Does it allow us to interpret and understand significant turning points and historical change in original ways? Are we merely covering old ground, only entering through a different door? Paying more attention to and integrating the intrinsic elements of [religion]...can expand historical narratives while highlighting the validity of [religion] as a way to interpret the American past."



Debates - or even anxieties - over the role of religion in American history are nothing new, of course. But observing the ongoing development of a young field offers valuable lessons for historians of religion. This is a moment for us to learn from each other. Even if not all historians would acknowledge the centrality of religion to American history, most would agree that historians of religion have contributed enormously to the Americanist field by producing histories beginning from religion and radiating outward to touch on numerous other facets of American history. To move from thought experiment to explicit argument, like food religion does "allow us to interpret and understand significant turning points and historical change in original ways." Yet the observational street is two-way: while food historians would benefit from tracing the re-entrance of religion to American historiography as a significant force, those of us concerned with religion would do well to note how food history is being integrated into broader conversations. What points of tension might be anticipated for food historians? How do those historians overcome them compared to our own developments? The evolution of food historiography will be all the more instructive, too, for the lighter emotional baggage of food. That is not to say food is "less serious" than religion, of course, but rather to observe that disputes over food itself, if not its historiographical implications, are frequently less emotionally fraught than those over religion.

There are several key differences between food and religion, to be sure. For one, everyone has to eat, while a great many neither profess religious belief nor feel that any such belief is necessary for a fulfilling life. Yet even such an intrinsic difference does little to lessen how deeply both food and religion can be and are to identity formation and maintenance, and both have exerted powerful influences over individuals and communities' lives in every era of American history. Perhaps even more interesting than the influence of either food or religion is the confluence of the two: patterns of keeping kosher by American Jews, for example, or the communal meal following a burial in numerous traditions, or the social function of fish fries in Catholic parishes during the liturgical season of Lent. My own memories of the latter conjure tastes, smells, and textures so enticing that it's impossible not to question whether deep-fried cod slathered in tartar sauce truly conveys the penitential spirit meant to be invoked by the Lenten Friday prohibition on meat - a commentary both on American foodways and on local expressions of theological-juridical requirements.

The future of food historiography is bright, so historians of religion will have ample opportunity to adapt lessons learned there within their own fields. Food was well-represented at the AHA Annual Meeting, with the word appearing almost fifty times in the Meeting's online program. It is emerging as a field of great interest - or, perhaps, re-emerging. As the other essays in the JAH roundtable proved, more developed historiographies of labor, immigration, and gender have not-infrequently used food to explicate broader questions of space, authority, and identity. The challenge now confronting historians is to reorient themselves away from using food as an indicator of broader trends; or, to adapt Padoongpatt’s language, to move from food as historiographical condiment - enhancing certain notes of and conferring complexity on our histories - to food as the main course. Those of us devoted to the study of religion ought to consider whether we have successfully made the same transition and, if not, look to the future of food historiography for a fuller understanding of where we fit into the discipline. Bon appétit.


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